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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

JACK A. :MILLIGAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.MELVIN COY HARWARD,
KENNETH B. McDUFFY,
and C. E. LINDSEY,
DefcllclaJlts and Respondents.

Case No. 9121

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PHELI.JUXARY

STATE~IE~T

Throughout this brief, plaintiff and appellant will be
referred to as plaintiff, and defendant and respondent"
will be referred to by their surnames or as defendants.
All italics are ours.
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STATEMJ£N'r OF FACTS
Plaintiff was a guest passenger in an automobile
driven by defendant, :Melvin Coy Harward, on the 15th
of August, 1958, which collided with the truck of defendant, Lindsey, at approximately 1:30 A.M.
Prior to the collision, plaintiff, James Finnegan, and
Harward had been playing pool in the Lackawanna Club
at 3110 South State Street.
As plaintiff, Harward and Finnegan, played pool
they drank beer purchased from the Club. Plaintiff and
Finnegan had had one glass of beer to drink during the
evening of August 14th, prior to the time that they arrived
at the Lackawanna Club and before they ate their supper.
Both Finnegan and plaintiff testified that they noticed nothing wrong with the way that the defendant,
Harward, played pool; that as far as they could observe
his behavior was entirely normal and regular. Plaintiff
and Finnegan n1et Harward at the Lackawanna Club.
Harward had had no supper before con1ing to the Club.
(R.160). After the plaintiff, Finnegan, and Hanvard had
completed their pool games they went out of the Lackawanna Club to the defendant Harward's car and started
north along State Street toward the New China Cafe located at about 2150 South State Street.
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Defendant, Kenneth B. :McDuffy, was the driver of
a K.enilworth truck and trailer and had parked the vehicles at 2195 South State Street. Harward's automobile
came into collision with the left rear of the truck. The
·weather was rainy. Plaintiff was seated in the car with
back against the door on the righthand side relaxed and
discussing with the driver Harward their social affairs
and did not observe anything ahead of the car in which
he was riding prior to its impact.
Plaintiff was seriously injured as result of the collision and at the time of the trial had not recovered fully
from the effects of the accident.
Plaintiff claimed that the defendant Harward was
guilty of wilful rnisconduct, or was intoxicated, at the
time of the irnpact in which he received his injuries
and that said conduct was the proxirnate cause of the injury and collision.
Plaintiff claimed that the defendants, McDuffy and
Lindsey, were negligent in that the truck which was parked on the east side of State Street was unlighted and
protruded out into the lane of traffic norrnally reserved
for travelers proceeding in a northerly direction.
The evidence revealed that neither plaintiff nor Finnegan, the guests in the autornobile of Harward, had
noticed anything peculiar or unusual about Harward's
conduct and did not believe, at the tirne they entered his
autonwbile, that he "·as under the influence of intoxicatSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing liquor, although both had played several hours of pool
with him and observed hin1 drinking beer as the game
of pool proceeded. Officer Iba, after the accident, observed Harward for a while and formed the opinion that
he was intoxicated. (R. 61).
Neither plaintiff nor Finnegan noticed anything unusual about the way that Harward operated his car as he
drove it the few blocks north along State Street immediately prior to the collision.
Harward stated that i1nmediately prior to the impact
he turned his head away fron1 the front to the right facing
to the back seat to take a cigarette from Finnegan who
was seated in the back seat. That as he came back the
impact occurred. (R. 162).
After the presentation of plaintiff's evidence the trial
court granted the motions of all defendants for dismissal
of plaintiff's case on the ground and for the reason that
the evidence would not justify a verdict in plaintiff's
favor. From this Order of the Trial Court, plaintiff has
prosecuted his appeal to this Court.

SUl\IMARY OF ARGUlfENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED THAT HARWARD
WAS GUILTY OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT OR INTOXICASponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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TION PROXIMATELY CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.
(a) HARWARD WAS GUILTY OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT IN TURNING AROUND AND LOOKING 'TO THE
BACK SEAT AS HE DROVE NORTH ON STATE STREET.
POINT .II
THE EVIDENCE CREATED A QUES'TION OF FACT
AS TO THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED THAT THE DEFENDANTS McDUFFY AND LINDSEY WERE GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTING TO ·CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES .

.ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRA'TED THAT HARWARD
WAS GUILTY OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT OR INTOXICATION PROXIMATELY CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.

The Jury was furnished with sufficient factual basis
for a finding that the defendant, Harward, was intoxicated at the tune of the collision and injury of plaintiff.
The evidence and testi1nony of the witnesses is relatively
free from conflict. Harward adn1itted that he had conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sun1ed at least five cans of beer while playing pool with
plaintiff and Finnegan. Officer Iba, after observing Harward for a considerable ti1ne caine to the conclusion that
he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The
evidence showed that Har\vard had not eaten anything
since approximately 2 :00 or 3 :00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Under such circu1nstances the effect of the beer would be
greater than the smne amount of beverage on plaintiff
and Finnegan, who had eaten a substantial supper prior
to coming to the Club. The Jury might logically find
that Harward was nwre affected by the beer which he
drank because of the lack of food in his stomach than
would have normally have been the case. Five cans of
beer or five glasses of beer could be sufficient to affect
his ability to drive and to make him unable to carefully
and safely operate his vehicle. Iba's testimony from observation over a considerable period of tune would be
sufficient basis for the finding that Harward was intoxicated.
Each case must stand on its own peculiar factual
basis, but perhaps a consideration of a few of the cases
from this and other jurisdictions would be of assistance.
The closest case on the facts and law is Johnson v.
lllarqui·s, 93 Cal. App. 2nd 3-U, 209 P.:2d 63. The California Guest Statute is si1nilar in wording to our Utah
Guest Rtatute. The basir legal principles were the
t:laine as will be applied in this Court. In the Johnson
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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case, the owner and driver of the automobile had not
eaten anything during the afternoon and had only a cup
of coffee and a sandwich for her lunch. She, and the two
passengers, stopped at a cafe and there the driver had
one Seven-up highball. She took over the driving of the
autornobile and drove from that tirne until she struck the
back of a parked truck which had a red light burning at
its rear. The road over which she drove was a two-lane
highway and the night was stormy. The evidence shows
that she drove at 80 to 90 miles per hour even though
there were rnany turns in the highway.
The California Appellate Court emphasized the fact
that the driver had not eaten for a considerable period
prior to the tirne that she had the one Seven-up highball
and pointed out that the exact effect of intoxicants on any
one person is dependent on a number of factors and may
be different in one state of bodily chemistry from what
it is in another state of bodily chemistry. The Court
upheld the Jury verdict and found that the driver was
guilty of wilful rnisconduct or intoxication in causing the
collision with the rear end of the truck and the injuries
to the passengers.
In Cox c. Johnson, ______ Colo. ______ , 339 P. 2d 989, the
driver was drinking beer but appeared before the accident to have been sober. The evidence revealed that prior
to the accident the driver had drunk front three to nine
beers. Two witnesses testified that he did not appear
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to be drunk. The plaintiff himself observed defendant
drinking three or four beers.
The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the questions
of intoxication, assumption of risk, and wilful misconduct, were all questions of fact for the Jury. Plaintiff
subrnits that the Cox v. Johnson case is in point on all of
the questions before this Court.

Perry v. Schm~tt, 184 Kan. 758, 339 P. 2d 36, is a
case where the guest observed the driver drinking and
the Court ruled that the question of intoxication was a
question of fact for the Jury.
It is respectfully submitted that under the principles
of law applicable and the evidence the Jury could have
found, considering the evidence most favorably to the
plaintiff, that Harward was intoxicated at the time of the
collision.
SUB POINT "A"
(a) HARWARD WAS GUILTY OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT IN TURNING AROUND AND LOOKING 'TO THE
BACK SEAT AS HE DROVE NORTH ON STATE STREET.

The conduct of the defendant, Harward, in turning
around to take a cigarette from passenger, Finnegan,
riding in the back seat is wilful misconduct. It was a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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proxi1nate cause of the collision between his car and the
truck.
This Court has had a cigarette case before it on one
prior occasion. In Ricciuti v. Roberts, 2 Utah 2d 45, 269
P.2d 282, the driver of the automobile dropped a cigarette in his clothing and while hunting the cigarette went
over the curb and caused the injury to his passenger. The
decision, reversing the Jury Verdict, was that the conduct
of the driver was not the intentionally doing or omitting
to do a negligent act, but that his hunting for the cigarette was an involuntary act and could not be the basis of a
verdict which must be based on wilful misconduct. The
Court pointed out that the cigarette was not intentionally
dropped, and as a consequence it could not be held to be
wilful.
In the present case, the distinction is clear. Harward, in turning around to the right to take a cigarette
from a person riding in the back seat was not acting involuntarily but was voluntarily and intentionally acting.
It seems obvious his act was very dangerous. This is
especially true since he had begun to pull over toward
the right-hand side of the highway preparatory to stopping at the New China Cafe.
There are a number of cases that have held that
voluntarily and intentionally taking your eyes off the
road is gross negligence or wilful misconduct.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Gttstaveson v. J' ernon, 165 Kebr. 745, 87 NW 2d.
395, was a case in which the driver took her eyes off the
road for approximately four second:-:;, and during that
time the car whi~h she was driving veered across the
road into a parked automobile on the side of the road and
caused the injuries to her guest resulting in a jury verdict
in her .favor. The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the
verdict and considered the conduct on the part of the
driver to be sufficient to justify a finding of the jury
that she was guilty of gross negligence.

In Dirks v. Gates, 182 Kan. 581, 322 P.2d 750, the
driver turned his head from the road to look back and observe traffic on the road behind him. As a result, the
automobile went out of control and the injuries to hi8
guest occurred. The Court held that such conduct on
the part of the driver \vas wanton negligence and upheld
the verdict in favor of the guest.

Topel v. Correz, 273 \Vis. 611, 79 N\V 2d 253, is a
case of the driver being somewhat intoxicated, driving
along the highway and watching the speedometer rather
than keeping his eyes on the road and as a consequence
the automobile ran off the road· and into a tree injuring
the owner of the autmnobile who was riding in it as a
passenger. The Court held that this conduct on the part
of the ·driver was sufficient to justify a verdict in favor
of the owner guest riding in the automobile.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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SimJJson v. lJfarks, 349 Ill. App. 527, 111 NE 2d.

310, is a case of a driver who, the passenger claimed,
took his hands off the wheel and attempted to make love
to her while driving the automobile. The driver claimed,
however, that he turned his head from the road to watch
an accident scene that had occurred in the opposite lane
of traffic and as a result the collision occurred. The
Court considered both plaintiff's claim that the driver
attempted to make love to her and took his hands off the
wheel, and the driver's claim that what occurred was that
he was looking back watching an automobile accident in
the opposite lane of traffic. Defendant claimed that the
plaintiff's story that he took his hands off the wheel to
make love to her was so improbable and unreasonable as
not to be worthy of belief. The Court ruled that even
defendant's own story that he turned around to watch an
automobile accident in the opposite lane of traffic would
justify the Jury's verdict. The driver would be still guilty
of wilful and wanton misconduct.

Perhaps the case closest to the facts of the case
presently before the Court is McGowan v. Camp, 87 Ga.
App. 671, 75 S.E. 2d 350. In this case, the driver of the
auton1obile took her right hand off the wheel and her
eyes off the road in order to reprimand her small son who
was riding in the front seat with her. The Court held
this conduct sufficient to constitute gross negligence and
justify a verdict in favor of the guest of the driver.
The Court pointed out that this kind of action was an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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intentional and deliberate act on the part of the driver
as distinguished from an involuntary act. This distinction exists between the vresent case and Rvcciuti v. Robinson, 2 Utah 2d 45, 269 P .2d 282.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the conduct of
the defendant, Harward, was deliberate and wilful. It
was the kind of action which was known and realizable as
would greatly endanger persons riding in the automobile
with the driver.
Such act, it is respectfully submitted, would justify
a jury verdict on behalf of the plaintiff, if no intoxication
was even considered. When considered with the fact of
intoxication it would, of course, be n1uch more forceful as
far as justifying a Jury verdict in favor of plaintiff.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE CREATED A QUES'TION OF FACT
AS TO THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF.

The Court's granting of defendant's :Jiotion to dismiss plaintiff's case might be justified upon a mistaken
belief that under the evidence the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as matter of law.
There has been a great deal of appellate consideration
of the question of whether or not a guest's knowledge
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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that the driver of the autmnobile in which he was riding
had been drinking is sufficient to preclude recovery of
the guest.
Smne Courts have based the denial of a guest's
right of recovery on the idea that the guest assumed the
risk of injury in entering the automobile knowing that the
driver had been drinking. Other ·Courts have considered
it a siinple question of contributory negligence on the
part of the guest. The soundest rule seems to be the one
which was adopted by this Court and set up in the case
of Shoemaker v. Floor, 117 Utah 434, 217 P. 2d 382. The
guest in the Schoemaker case observed the defendant take
three drinks prior to the time that she got in the car
and com1nenced her ride back to Salt Lake City. She
testified, however, that even though she observed him take
three drinks, the driver did not appear in any way to be
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. This Court
held that under such circu1nstances the guest did not assume the risk as Inatter of law, and was not guilty of
contributory negligence.
Applying the principle set down in the Shoemaker
v. Floor supra case, it would appear that even though
plaintiff here knew that defendant Harward had been
drinking beer, unless he knew it had so affected Harward
as to incapacitate hin1 from driving safely and prudently, he would not be guilty of contributory negligence nor
would he haYe been held to asstnne risk as matter of law.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The principle applied by this Court in the Schoemaker case is similar to the principles applied by the California Court under sirnilar Statute in the case of Johnson
v. Marquis) 93 Cal. App. 2d 341, 209 P.2d 63. There,
the guests were present with the driver when she drank
one Seven-up highball, and thereafter drove the autornobile into the back of a parked truck. The Court held
that the guests did not assume the risk, or were not guilty
of contributory negligence as matter of law. Each case
must depend on the particular facts involved, and such
facts are properly submitted to the Jury for determination.

Cox v. J ohnsonJ ______ Colo. ______ , 239 P. 2d 989, holds
that the fact that the guest observed the driver drinking
three or four beers did not, as n1atter of law, make him
guilty of assumption of risk or contributory negligence.

In Topel v. CorrezJ 273 \Vis. 611, 79 NW 2d 253, the
owner of the auton1obile, because he, himself, was intoxicated and did not feel cmnpetent to drive his own car,
requested another person to drive for hin1. The other
driver wa~ intoxicated and ·while watching the speedorneter on the autonwbile ran off the road into a tree and
injured the owner of the car who ·was his guest. The
Court held that under the facts the owner guest was not
guilty of contributory negligence or asstunption of ri~k
so that his recovery could be barred as n1atter of law.
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Davis v. Hollowell, 326 _l\lich. 673, 40 NW 2d 641,
15 ALR 2d 1160, holds that knowledge on the part of a
guest that driver had been drinking is not sufficient without more to bar the guest's recovery.

The annotation of the Davis v. Hollowell case, 15
ALR 2d 1165, is a very complete enumeration and analysis of the various holdings concerning the question of
knowledge and contributory negligence, or assumption of
risk. The annotators state their conclusion as follows:
"It has been held in a number of cases that
mere knowledge that the driver has been drinking
is not sufficient to preclude recovery under Guest
Statutes."
In support of this conclusion the Annotation cites
cases from California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, :Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Y ermont, Virginia, Washington, and cites the Utah case of Shoemaker v. Floor.
The annotation recites the principle that for a passenger
to be barred from recovery he must know, or in the exercise of ordinary care, should know that the driver is so
intoxicated as to be incapacitated frmn driving safely and
prudently before recovery could be barred as 1natter of
law.
Plaintiff respectfully sub1nits that there is no showing frmn the evidence presented that he knew, or in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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exercise of ordinary care should have known that Harward was intoxicated so as to be incapacitated from driving safely and prudently. rrhe action of the Trial Court
cannot be justified on any theory that plaintiff assumed
the risk, or was guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED 'THAT THE DEFENDANTS McDUFFY AND LINDSEY WERE GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTING TO ·CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.

One of the most hotly contested questions of fact in
the presentation of plaintiff's evidence was where exactly
the truck was parked on the highway and whether or not
there were parking lights burning on it. Appendix "A"
is a photograph of the drawing made by Officer Iba to
illustrate his testimony and to show the various measurements which were made at the scene of the accident.
The Statutes of the State of Utah require that a
vehicle be parked not more than eighteen (18) inches
from the curb, U.C.A. 1953, Section 41-6-104. No truck
operating on the highway 1nay legally exceed eight feet
in width, U.C.A. 1953, Section :27-1-:27. Officer Iba and
the Appendix .. A" indicates that to the center of the rear
wheel on the truck of Lindsey was 11 feet 5% ths inches
frorn the curb line of State Street. This measuren1ent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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shows that the truck of the defendant Lindsey was not
properly parked assuming that its width conformed and
was the lawful width for such vehicles under the laws
of the State of Utah.
Defendant Harward testified that there were no
lights on the rear of the parked truck innnediately prior
to the collision. (R. 163). L'.C.A. 1953, Sectvon 41-6-129
requires a vehicle to have such a light where it cannot
be seen within a distance of 500 feet upon such highway.
Harward also testified that the right front of his
automobile struck the left rear of the truck, and that
the point of i1npact was barely a fraction of inches and
had he been a few inches further out in the street he
would have missed the truck, or had the truck been parked
a few inches closer to the curb he would have cleared it.
(R.168)
There can be no doubt that where there is more than
one cause of a collision all parties Inay be held responsible
where negligence is found to exist.
In Berry i'. Visser, 35-1 :\lieh. 38, 92 NW 2d 1, the
Supreme Court of the State of :Michigan held that even
though a driver is negligent the negligence of the owner
and driver of a parked vehicle may likewise be a proximate cause of the accident and both parties can be held
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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responsible for the ultimate damage to a party injured
as a result of the collision.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the evidence of
Iba and the drawing, Appendix "A", together with the
laws of the State of Utah, would justify submission to
the Jury of the question of whether or not the defendants,
McDuffy and Lindsey, were negligent, and whether or
not their negligence was a proximate cause of the collision between the automobile in which plaintiff was a
passenger and the truck parked at the side of the road
into which the automobile collided.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the facts of the
case and the law of the State of Utah demonstrate that
the Trial Court was in error in granting the motions of
the defendant for dismissal of plaintiff's case at the
close of plaintiff's evidence. The Judgment should be
reversed. Plaintiff should be granted a new trial and
an opportunity to have his cause of action submitted to a
Jury for their consideration and determination.
Respectfully subn1itted,
KING AND HUGHES
Counsel for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
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